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Comments on Interior Department FIIP Submission on the EIS
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Introduction The
following observations relate to comments made in a February 29 letter
from the Regional Environmental Officer of the U.S. Department of the
Interior (DOI) to the New York District Engineer of the US Army Corps of
Engineers. The Department
listed ten major issues that it sees as preventing an endorsement of the
Corps' recommended interim beach nourishment project for Fire Island.
In general, the DOI comments lack substance and balance and
reflect extreme prejudice against an economically justified, soundly
engineered and environmentally benign project. The
boldface headings that follow are those of the Department.
The observations are those of the Fire Island Association, a
volunteer organization of more than 1,600 families and businesses on
Fire Island. 1.
The DEIS has not
satisfied NEPA's requirements to identify reasonable The
first of DOI's 10 points asserts that the DEIS fails to present a
reasonable alternative to the project.
DOI would prefer an alternative that would (a) utilize the state
Coastal Erosion Hazard Area (CEHA) definition of dunes as the project
area; (b) incor-porate legal assurance that no increased development
will occur within the dune area; and (c) entail no construction of [a]
dune except, apparently, where a dune already exists.
DOI further alleges that the proposed alternatives are
"inconsistent with the Congressional scheme for the Fire Island
National Seashore, which is to preserve dune features and
ultimately to eliminate dunefront construction through acquisition and
zoning controls." (Emphasis added.)
There
is no such "Congressional scheme."
Under the guise of seeking “reasonable alternatives,” the
report writer would shift DOI's responsibility for land-use matters at
the Fire Island National Seashore (FINS) to the Corps of Engineers, and
thus hold the project hostage on a matter that should be resolved
without reference to the latter agency.
Regulation
of construction in Fire Island's dune areas was established with the
implementation of Article 34 of the state's Environmental Conservation
Law (Ch. 841, Laws of 1981). Regulations
promulgated under this statute (6 NYCRR, Part 505) makes unbuildable all
land southerly of a line drawn 25 feet landward of the primary dune that
is augmented or newly constructed by the project, the Coastal Erosion
Hazard Area, or CEHA. This new law places large numbers of previously developed
building sites off-limits to construction.
For example, in Kismet, Saltaire and Fair Harbor, the three
westerly Fire Island communities, more than 150 once-developed parcels
have been eliminated by unchecked erosion.
The parcels are now in the sea or on the unprotected beach.
The communities have not suggested that any of these former
parcels be made usable. To
the contrary, most believe a new primary dune, kept free of new
construction and augmented by regular beach nourishment, would provide
protection to the communities and keep the barrier island intact.
Instead of seeking a constructive dialogue based on the
communities’ reasoned and future-oriented approach to erosion control,
the DOI report writer attempts instead to foist off on the Corps of
Engineers DOI's own responsibility to deal with the communities on
land-use issues. In the
process, he demonstrates contempt for the Corps' engineering expertise
and disdain for the communities’ feeble attempts to secure protection
through beach scraping, sand fencing, grass planting, and other
self-help measures. (See
FIA's White Paper, "The Fire Island Interim Project Will Not Cause
Building on the Dunes," April 2000.) Under
NEPA, the scope of alternatives to be considered in detail is limited to
those that will achieve the underlying purposes of the project City
of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d.862 (D.C.Cir. Dec.17, 1999).
Here, the project purpose is “to alleviate conditions conducive
to the threat of storm damages in the study area by providing temporary
storm damage protection until the findings of the Reformulation Study
are available and more permanent protection can be implemented, if
necessary.” DEIS at 1-2.
The DOI comments propose alternatives that have nothing to do
with the underlying purpose of the interim project. The DOI's main
intent is, clearly, to remove all homes along the oceanfront.
Indeed, the Draft Decision Document states that “the NPS has
identified this plan [to acquire the estimated 380 properties located
within the CEHA] as their long term plan.” (DDD p. 63)
But that is not an option available to the Department.
While the agencies may wish to consider the efficacy of the
DOI’s suggestions during the Reformulation Study, they do not
constitute a reasonable alternative for NEPA analysis purposes of an
interim project. The DOI report improperly seeks to force the Corps to
adopt DOI's long-term agenda regarding property acquisition, despite the
fact that it the agenda is not related to what the Corps is charged with
accomplishing. Moreover, it
is unjust and unprofessional for DOI to continue to delay decisions on a
project designed to address severe erosion resulting from human caused
actions that have prevented the natural sand nourishment of Fire Island
beaches for more than three decades.
Protection
of those beaches is consistent with the Congressional intent of
maintaining Fire Island for the use and enjoyment of future generations.
DOI’s focus on increased land acquisition goes far beyond the
structure of the zoning scheme contemplated for the FINS, which is based
on maintenance of the status quo with respect to private property, and
restricting condemnation to limited circumstances. (See Pub. Law No. 98- 482 limiting the authority of the
Secretary to condemn and directing the Secretary to establish new
guidelines to govern zoning in a manner that “reconciles the
population density of the Seashore on October 17, 1984 with resource
protection.” 130 Cong.
Rec. 28853.) The FIIP
should not serve as a means to upset the delicate balance crafted by
Congress when it created the Fire Island National Seashore. Nor
is it the province of the Corps of Engineers to intervene in the mutual
accommodation between property owners and DOI that was inherent in the
establishment of the FINS. If
there are problems arising from unchecked erosion, DOI ought first to
address such issues in cooperation with the Corps and New York’s
Department of Environmental Conservation, as mandated by the Fire Island
National Seashore Act, 16 U.S.C § 459e-7.
Then it should engage the property owners in constructive
dialogue about how to deal with repetitive losses, post-storm
reconstruction issues, zoning matters, and other points of mutual
interest. Unfortunately,
DOI has instead chosen to use the FIIP NEPA process as a means to force
concessions on issues unrelated to the project purpose of interim storm
damage protection. In
essence, DOI views the FIIP as an opportunity to secure funding to
eliminate all homes along the oceanfront, even though it has not sought
funds for this purpose from Congress, and has ignored promising ways to
deal with development issues on a long term basis.
While some measures were not given full consideration, as they
would not be consistent with the short-term nature of an interim
project, the Corps' Draft Decision Document noted a variety of measures
that can be used at a later date. These include land exchanges, land donations for tax
benefits, and conservation easements with tax abatement for a period
long enough to determine whether a parcel will ever again be buildable,
among other things. Consideration
of this approach would, of course, require closer coordination with
municipal zoning authorities, County and State governments and the
property owners than has heretofore been evident. At
the same time, none of these activities is for the Corps of Engineers to
lead. DOI cannot escape its
responsibilities for land-use by insisting that the relatively well-
funded Corps do the things DOI is charged with doing. DOI must first see to it that the intention of Congress is
carried out with respect to working with the island property owners.
It can’t avoid this responsibility by pleading that it lacks
the funds and staff to deal with the problems confronting it, nor by
foisting off the land-use obligations to a sister agency that is charged
with different responsibilities. Thus, even if “preventing
future development” is a sound “alternative” to a long-term
program of protecting the shoreline, it is not an alternative that is
properly the subject of a limited project of short duration. 2.
The DEIS does not adequately justify or explain the need for
the project. Comment
2 alleges that "debatable interpretations of the coastal threat to
the area are based on a limited database."
The analyst notes that "The
role of existing inlets in causing flood damage to the estuarine
shore is not quantifiably separated from overwash."
[This
is perhaps because there is no
quantifiable overwash.] "Major reliance upon computer models is used to assess implications
in the future, which are not well discussed as to their
acceptance levels versus ambivalence in producing precise values
for important estimators." It
is small wonder that the Corps sometimes throws up its hands at the
prospect of trying to respond to such comments.
This comment clearly demonstrates that DOI’s
critique goes well beyond the scope of the agency’s expertise and its
assigned role. Both the
FINS enabling legislation and the FINS General Management Plan require
that NPS rely on the Corps of Engineers' expertise in determining the
appropriateness of different erosion control measures.
See 16 U.S.C. § 459e (7(a); GMP at 33.
DOI's analyst, however, sees fit to question the Corps' detailed,
scientific analysis. Instead, he sets up a philosophical “difference
of opinion” over the need for sand nourishment in a hairsplitting
attack on minutiae of the voluminous data presented by the Corps.
The attack is unwarranted, unsupported by any countervailing
information, and in no way mounts a substantive challenge the cost
benefit analysis that provides the economic justification for the
interim project. The Corps used accepted methods for determining NED benefits
and supported it with detailed, quantifiable data in coming up with a
1.3 C/B number. DOI’s
broadside attack on this carefully developed calculation is obviously
aimed at delaying implementation of the project.
DOI may not substitute its own views of the scientific and
technical situation for that of the agency charged with making the
determination. As a
commenting agency, DOI should focus on those areas relevant to its
purview; namely, environmental matters related to endangered species and
issues related to the operation of the Fire Island National Seashore. Its uninformed comments on engineering, geologic and
technical matters do not contribute meaningfully to the Corps' decision
on whether a beach nourishment project is needed, much less how it
should be designed. Thus,
when DOI says that the Corps' arguments in favor of the project are not
"adequately explained," it should be remembered that it is for
the Corps, not the DOI analyst, to estimate whether a breach is likely,
and how to deal with the situation if it is.
Similarly, the fact that "beaches have grown larger in many
areas over the past ten years" does not gainsay the fact that it
has narrowed in others, nor alleviate concern about the diminution of
the overall volume of sand that makes up the barrier between the
Atlantic Ocean and the south shore of Long Island. The
DOI analyst tries to minimize the need for the project by downplaying
the likelihood of a breach, noting that it "is low for most of the
project area.” But he
fails to mention that the Corps pointed out two areas that are prime
candidates for breaching were not allowed to be included in the project:
Old Inlet and Talisman/Barrett Beach.
While he notes that “Fire Island has not been breached in
historic times, and that the beach has grown larger in many areas in the
last ten years” he does not mention that many other areas have become
smaller for lack of sand. Putting
aside the fact that DOI has exceeded the scope of its agency expertise,
it has not provided any convincing evidence to refute the Corps'
extensive analysis of the problem, nor called into question the efficacy
of its proposed solution; i.e., the interim project.
Of course, a determined opponent who examines the data long
enough is likely to discover some perceived shortcoming, but this does
not mean that the Corps has not done a more than adequate job of
analyzing the problem and solution. NEPA does not demand perfection through an endless round of
studies before an agency may act. 3. The project as proposed
will result in adverse environmental impacts. The
potential adverse environmental impacts the DOI analyst sees are related
to backbay habitat and sea life in the project area.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, reviewed the
project and found no objection to it based on environmental or other
concerns. EPA’s letter to
the Corps concluded that the project “will not only protect existing
habitats for two federally threatened species … within the study area
but may include designs to create habitats that are favorable to the
Piping Plover … [and the project] will not cause a significant direct
or indirect adverse impact (or contribute to a significant cumulative
impact) to offshore borrow area habitats, and will not cause significant
impacts to air quality, water quality, or wetlands.” (1/28/00 letter from Robert W. Hargrove, Chief, Strategic
Planning and Multi-Media Programs Branch, EPA Region 2 to Frank L.
Santomauro, Chief, Planning Division Corps of Engineers N.Y District)
As required by its internal guidelines (see
EPA, "Policy and Procedures for the Review of Federal Actions
Impacting the Environment," October 3, 1984), in performing its
review, EPA utilized its environmental expertise to determine whether
the action agency articulated and documented the reasoning that supports
its decision, analyzed data concerning the potential impacts of the
proposed action on the environment and human health, and determined that
a reasonable effort was made to inform and involve the public in the EIS
development process. Again,
EPA’s analysis is unequivocal in its view that the environmental
impacts of the FIIP are minimal.
DOI's
analyst, however, is cavalier in addressing “environmental impacts.”
For example, he blandly states that breaches and overwashes are
good, apparently because they are "natural."
In fact, however, the overall situation is decidedly unnatural.
The barrier island system inlets have been long since been
stabilized, thereby removing the hydrological forces that would cause
new inlets to open and existing ones to close. Breaches caused by the effect of the Westhampton groins were
closed before the existing Moriches Inlet could fill with sand.
(It is far cheaper to maintain an existing inlet than to build
the structures needed to stabilize a new one.)
Given the unnatural conditions that have existed since the
present inlet was stabilized and the Westhampton groinfield constructed,
the only way to achieve the overwash conditions DOI finds desirable is
to create them artificially. The
Corps is perfectly capable and willing to do this (see
comment 9 below). Indeed,
the FINS enabling legislation contemplates DOI contributing land on
which new inlets can be created when needed to adjust salinity levels in
Great South Bay. 16 U.S.C. § 459e-7(b) Nor
is DOI's insistence that the present highly erosional situation is
“natural” supported by the known coastal science.
The Corps has not admitted that earlier decisions at Westhampton
(where groinfield compartments were not filled and sand was not
regularly bypassed at inlets because of local funding problems),
materially contributed to present day erosion rates on Fire Island (see
Comment 7 below). Regardless
of what happened there, and why, the Corps has an obligation to explain
the impact of man's actions on Fire Island erosion rates.
It has conducted extensive studies of the subject but has so far
not characterized the results in terms that can be understood either to
support or reject the concept that man's actions are in part responsible
for erosion of the barrier island system.
At the same time, there is no evidence to support, and EPA’s
letter contradicts, DOI's contention that sea life would be permanently
and significantly affected by the project, or that development in dune
areas is a leading cause of erosion.
The inconsistency that erosion is "natural" on the one
hand and that it is caused by dune development on the other to one side,
there is evidence that contradicts the first theory and none to support
the second. As
for "negative" effects on "quality of life for residents
and visitors," the need to nourish the beaches of Fire Island is
well known to beachfront property owners.
As for visitors (as well as wildlife), there is ample evidence
that both much prefer wide beaches to narrow ones.
Moreover, restoration of the beaches is consistent with the
mandate of increasing public recreational access. 4. The DEIS fails to
adequately provide for the mitigation of environmental impacts. DOI
ignores the substantial mitigation measures identified in the DEIS. See
DEIS at 4-105 to 4-111 (Project Minimization Measures). The list of
measures to be implemented is consistent with the notion that the agency
shall adopt “all practicable means to avoid or minimize harm from the
alternative selected. 40
CFR §1505.2 (c) The DEIS
also includes substantial monitoring and enforcement measures for such
mitigation. EPA obviously
found this program to be reasonable when it rated the project as LO-1
and stated that the project will not result in “significant adverse
environmental impacts.” (See
1/28/2000 letter from Robert Hargrove, supra
p. 5) Since the release of
the DEIS, the Corps has been energetic and supportive in the area of
habitat enhancement via "environmental features" of the
project. In this
connection, at February 10 and May 4, 2000 meetings with the National
Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, and state and county wildlife
experts, the Corps described in detail what can be accomplished along
these lines in various reaches of the interim project, and how Corps
activities can contribute. DOI
further strains credibility when it evinces concern about the lack of
mitigation measures for the effect of construction activities.
Equipment is unlikely to permanently harm a beach or the
invertebrate colonies on it. For
example, a moment’s reflection about DOI’s concern for “silt and
shells on the beach” as a result of sand pumping would lead most to
conclude that the silt will be washed away in the first rains, and
shells quickly pulverized and mixed with sand.
Moreover, as demonstrated in the Westhampton project, piping
plovers are unaffected by the presence of silt and shells and may even
prefer such habitat. The
DOI analyst may find comfort in such simplistic concepts, but it is a
stretch to find in them reasons why the project should not go forward. 5. The baseline conditions
in the project area are inadequately described, limiting the predictive
ability of the impact analyses. In
fact, the “baseline conditions” described in the DEIS are sufficient
in terms of meeting the Corps' NEPA responsibility.
DOI has engaged in a strategy of delaying the project and then
expressing concern that study data is outdated.
NEPA does not require, however, that the Corps engage in an
unending cycle of updating data that has already been gathered.
The Corps has indicated that certain studies related to the
Reformulation Study will be continued during the implementation of the
Interim Project. These
include on-going and planned fisheries and invertebrate studies, see
DEIS at 3-48, as well as studies that are related to further defining
the relevant baseline and impact analysis for the barrier and backbay
environments of the south shore of Long Island, see
DEIS at 3-73 to 3-74. However,
the baseline for the Interim Project set out in Section 3 of the DEIS is
based on a substantial amount of data and environmental studies. The discussion of the Affected Environment is consistent with
the level of detail required by NEPA, which requires that the EIS
“succinctly describe the environment of the areas to be affected . . .
by the alternatives under consideration.”
40 C.F.R. § 1502.15. Again,
EPA did not call this issue into question.
6. The Draft Decision
Document does not accurately reference or comply with the Fire Island
National Seashore General Management Plan. While
quick to criticize the Corps for referencing older scientific studies,
DOI itself does not hesitate to invoke a 22-year old General Management
Plan as a basis for opposing the project.
While the region surrounding the Fire Island National Seashore
has undergone immense growth and change, DOI has not seen fit to
reexamine how the park should change as well.
If the Corps plan is “not consistent with” NPS plans for the
FINS perhaps it is because no such plans have been articulated for over
two decades. That
said, the Interim Project is consistent with the Resources Management provisions of the GMP.
A core management objective of the GMP is “[t]o manage Fire
Island in ways that will enhance natural processes and mitigate the
impacts of human interference with these processes.”
GMP at 24 This is
exactly what the Interim Project will accomplish.
The GMP makes it clear that DOI will rely on the Corps' expertise
in determining the appropriateness of different erosion control
measures. GMP at 32
Now that the Corps seeks to exercise this expertise, the DOI
analyst questions it.
In
fact, any reasonable analysis of the 1977 GMP would conclude that
Interior, not the Corps, would ignore its clear mandates.
For example, the GMP clearly recognized the “unnatural”
impact of man’s activities on the erosion at Fire Island:
“Interruption of the littoral drift has played a major role in the
acceleration of erosion of Fire Island’s beaches.”
GMP at 30 To remedy
this impact, the GMP states that “Ocean -facing dunes will be repaired
or restored as needed. Planting
with native, perennial dune stabilizing species to encourage
revegetation will be initiated throughout the seashore.”
GMP at 33 While
Interior chooses to ignore this language, the sound practicality of the
plan's directive that the National Park Service take action to repair
dune damage was evident in 1977, and is even more evident today.
Since nothing has been done, the damage to Fire Island’s
shoreline from man induced erosion has increased over the past 20 years,
and the loss to property and infrastructure that the GMP envisioned in
1977 has come to pass. The
Department’s attempt to hide behind an erroneous interpretation of the
GMP should be recognized as simply another excuse to delay or kill this
vital project. 7. The proposed design plan
for Design Reaches 2 and 3 inconsistent with NEPA and incompatible with
National Park Service Policy on sand replenishment. DOI
believes “configuring the dune around and south of existing
development will encourage increased development.”
The location of a beach fill project that must be economically
justified is largely dictated by cost factors.
The trade-off is between sand and real estate.
It is sometimes cheaper to increase the amount of sand to achieve
the design standard than to buy functioning beach houses and then
locating the project where the houses had been.
While it is easy for non-engineers to suggest how the project
could be “jogged” in this or that direction to accomplish goals
ancillary to the shore protection objective, complex engineering
decisions may have to made before doing so.
While such decisions must be left to the Corps, in fairness the
Corps should do a better job of explaining some of the considerations
that go into locating the project in one place rather than another.
When each agency tries to accommodate the others’ institutional
needs, questions like this may be easily settled. The
DEIS Problem Identification section states that, “problems encountered
in the FIIP study area
consist of the loss of sand fronting the populated areas due to
storm-induced erosion, and the deterioration of the natural protective
features and consequent storm damage to structures in Long Island’s
bay shore communities.” DEIS
at 1-2. DOI criticizes the
Corps because this section does not “indicate any human-caused event
that needs to be rectified.” But
few still question whether incomplete construction of the Westhampton
groinfield, failure to fill its compartments during that construction,
and failure to implement regular sand bypassing at Moriches Inlet, did
not contributed to depriving Fire Island of sand for the past 35 years. The
position taken by the DOI analyst is cynical, because he knows the Corps
must argue that the Westhampton groinfield and the Moriches Inlet
jetties, both Corps projects, do not cause erosion effects in central
and western Fire Island. For
its part, the Corps' "argument" must ignore the fact that the
groinfield compartments were not filled, which prevented millions of
cubic yards of sand from moving west to Fire Island.
Then, when the project was abandoned, the downdrift scour effect
caused breaches in the Westhampton spit in 1981 and 1993, as the Corps
predicted. More millions of
cubic yards of sand entered the bay, further depriving downdrift beaches
of westerly sand flow. Fortunately,
there are signs that the Moriches Inlet ebb delta is finally reattaching
to the barrier west of the inlet. There
are also grounds for optimism that the modification of the groinfield
and implementation of regular bypassing at Moriches Inlet will do much
to restore the natural westward flow of sand.
Still, for the Corps to admit that failure to modify the groins
earlier, to ensure that groinfield compartments were filled with sand,
or to implement regular bypassing in the past could be construed as an
admission against interest that would encourage litigation against the
government. Any resulting
lawsuit would likely drag on indefinitely and be ruled moot in the end
because of the corrective steps the Corps has taken.
A seasoned government analyst would should show some
understanding for the Corps’ position in this regard, and not
criticize the Corps for attempting to serve its government client and
ultimately the public interest. 8. The ACOE does not
adequately address development issues in the analysis of alternatives. Contrary
to DOI's assertion, as FIA's white paper discusses, houses, per
se, have not been
significant factors in dune deterioration on Fire Island. In fact, the oft-mentioned concern of wind scouring away sand
is not an important factor when plantings and sand fencing are in place.
Owners of houses along the oceanfront have done much good work in
building and nourishing the dunes through beach scraping, planting,
fertilizing, irrigating and fencing, and in most cases their actions
have been a net plus to the resource.
Still, the existing erosion situation the Corps has been called
on to address could have been avoided by a reasonable, ongoing program
of beach nourishment over the years.
Indeed, placement of a replenished dune southerly of the present
first row of houses in some cases, along with regular nourishment
thereafter, is the only practical solution to the Fire Island erosion
problem. This does
contemplate continued existence of houses near the dune area, however,
plus infilling in some places. That
means it will not meet DOI's objective of removing residential
construction from the beach. That
is an objective, however, that is not supported by the law or the
Department's mandate for Fire Island.
Nor
is there is any legal basis upon which the Corps could require a
"moratorium or other means of preventing further
construction," as the DOI analyst naively "insists."
There is no provision for imposing a moratorium on construction
in the community development district, either in the FINS Act or in the
zoning regulations adopted for FINS in the early 1990s, see
36 C.F.R. Pt. 28. In
addition to constitutional problems under state and local law, any
attempt to enact a moratorium would run counter to Congress’s intent
to insure the continued viability of the Fire Island communities and
respect for property rights. The notion that some 340 homes can be
“relocated” is totally impractical and would lead to protracted and
costly litigation. FIA
environmental counsel has reviewed the legal questions involved in a
construction moratorium and prepared a detailed analysis refuting the
DOI analyst's amazing statement, presented in boldface, italicized type:
"Therefore, we must insist that an enforceable building moratorium
be in place prior to any beach nourishment actions." It says little for the Department's supervisory or legal
review procedures that such a statement is put forth in a public
document. 9. The DEIS does not
include specific project features that will reduce impacts to threatened
and endangered species. DOI’s
double standard on this subject is described above (Comment 4).
In brief, the Corps is able and willing to implement virtually
any habitat enhancement program that DOI feels would be useful to the
preservation of threatened or endangered species.
The Corps has offered to create beach overwash areas, for
example, to prevent the loss of plover eggs to wave runup on certain
beaches. Instead of
availing itself of this offer DOI simply continues to deplore the fact
that it has not been made. In
response to Corps offers to create new or enhanced habitat for
endangered species, the complaint is heard that "We can't manage
the habitat we already have." If concern about wildlife were its real concern (rather than
preventing landowners' use of their property) DOI would work closely
with the Corps in building the habitats needed to enhance protection and
productivity of endangered wildlife.
Blocking the project, on the other hand, means narrower and lower
beaches, and, in general, an environment less conducive to the species
protection. The
DOI analyst writes that, "We recommended creation of active
overwash areas, clearing heavily vegetated areas, and reduction of fill
placement areas as potential measures to achieve this goal [of
maximizing preservation of piping plover and seabeach amaranth].
In the same section he states, "No dune grass planting, snow
fencing, or other dune stabilization activities may be conducted in
association with interim project features."
In one proposal he suggests destroying vegetation that exists and
in another recommends no dune grass planting or fencing, the best ways
known to prevent dune erosion. This after specifying that beach nourishment should be
restricted to the communities, where piping plovers, the presumed reason
for the strictures, are virtually unknown.
The logic is difficult to follow. 10. Impacts to visitor use
and recreation, and associated economic analyses, are inadequately
addressed in the DEIS and DDD. DOI’s
most cynical, not to say stupid, comment in this document is the
suggestion that the island itself, as well as its visitors, would be
better off without a beach nourishment project than with it, because the
project would entail work being done on the beach.
The Corps has successfully undertaken beach fill projects up and
down the American coastline (albeit usually with the enthusiastic
endorsement of state and local agencies) and a brief interference with
the ability to access the beach is seldom if ever raised as a reason for
not doing a project. Moreover,
the Park Service often grants permits for nourishment projects at other
national seashores. Certainly
a temporary dislocation is preferable to the permanent one likely to
result if the island is breached or so seriously eroded that auto and
truck beach traffic is forced inland. Beach
nourishment projects are routinely scheduled to take place in seasons
away from the times beaches are most in use, and when protected bird
species are courting, nesting or fledging checks.
Nor are projects so extensive in impact that beach users cannot
avoid the construction activity by moving a short distance along the
beach. CONCLUSION An
analysis of DOI’s ten points makes it clear that the DOI objective is
not the kind of interagency cooperation intended by Congress when it
wrote, “shore erosion control or beach protection measures [on Fire
Island] shall be exercised in accordance with a plan that is mutually
acceptable to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the
Army … .” 16 U.S.C. § 459e 7.
This was reiterated in the six-point agreement that the agencies
entered into in June 1999. Instead
of cooperating, DOI has shown a single-minded determination to effect
control of land use on the barrier island through the bureaucratic
manipulation of the beach protection process.
By this it is hoped that a return to the discredited
“retreat” doctrine can be effected.
If so, the policy, which is aimed at giving federal and state
government greater control over local shorelines, will meet strong
opposition from local government as well as property owners.
Costly and protracted litigation may well be expected to follow
violation of individual property rights. A
policy of interagency cooperation and restoration of the spirit of
mutual support that was the basis of the creation of the Seashore, would
go far toward solving this problem to the benefit of all sides, not to
mention to the general public. Fire Island Association
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